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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Putin, Rushailo and the Far East  
In August, President Vladimir Putin toured the Far Eastern Maritime Territory of 
Siberia with the stated intent of bringing the region's security and demographic 
crisis under control. A declining ethnic Russian population due to emigration and 
dropping birth rates, combined with a rapid rise in immigration (legal and illegal) 
from neighboring China, has the Kremlin skittish and worried.  
 
The Far East tour has shed further light on the role of Russia's Security Council 
and its secretary, Vladimir Rushailo. In the well-nigh public contest of wills 
between the Yel'tsin-era bureaucrats and Putin's St. Petersburgers, Secretary 
Rushailo is viewed as a prominent member of the Yel'tsin "family." His ascent to 
the key position in the once-prominent Security Council was seen at the time as 
a gain for the "family." However, many recent events -- including Putin's trip to 
the Far East - demonstrated the decline in Rushailo's role. 
 
Putin's highly publicized tour seemed devoted primarily to his "cult of the 
personality." At one news briefing the president was asked about a song devoted 
to him that is currently on the radio. Putin reportedly replied that he was pleased 
such songs were appealing and would like to meet the beautiful girls singing 
them. In other words, for Putin this was a publicity tour. Reporters were "asked to 
be careful about quoting the president's answers" in his informal meetings with 
the media. (NTV MIR, 24 Aug 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
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Rushailo and the Security Council constituted an afterthought to the tour. As part 
of the policy emphasis on the Far East, Putin assigned Rushailo and other select 
members of the Security Council to go on a fact-finding trip of their own, 
immediately following the president's visit. The focus of Rushailo's tour was to be 
Russia's security apparatus, including border guards, "power" ministries and the 
regular military. (RUSSIAN PUBLIC TV, ORT, 24 Aug 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) It appears that Russia's backyard will be held on a much 
tighter leash than during the past 10 years.  
 
However, Rushailo's tour involved no active role for the secretary himself. He 
was acting merely as a glorified envoy for President Putin; Rushailo's agenda 
had been set for him in advance, the substantive items decided by men more 
powerful than he is. Within the Yel'tsin "family," Alexander Voloshin as head of 
the Presidential Administration and Mikhail Kasyanov, currently the Russian 
prime minister, have much greater influence than did Rushailo's declining 
Security Council. In any case, Rushailo's trip terminated with his serious injuries 
in a major road accident. Now, automobile crashes constitute a familiar feature 
on Russia's landscape, not surprisingly given the national disease of alcoholism. 
However, quite a few of these accidents have occurred on suspiciously 
convenient occasions, including some in the midst of election campaigns. The 
jury is out, so to speak.  
 
The president's tour managed also to highlight the increasingly high level of self-
censorship attained by the Russian media. Not only were journalists 
"encouraged" to handle Putin gently, in some of the news briefings cameras were 
banned. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Michael Donahue 
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Unpleasant unfinished business 
When the ghost of unfinished business haunts Russian President Vladimir Putin 
and FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev, it focuses predictably on the manner in 
which Russia is fighting its "war on terror" and closing the book only slowly on 
more than 359 "terrorist bombings" which the government alleges have occurred 
since 1999. While the FSB claims to have solved 23 out of 27 criminal cases 
associated with these attacks, doubts abound concerning both the manner in 
which such cases were resolved and whether the threat of future attacks has 
diminished in the least. (INTERFAX, 1227 GMT, 4 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0904, via World News Connection) 
 
In its most (in)famous instance, the 1999 bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk 
which killed more than 300 persons, after almost three years of "investigation" 
the government seemingly has broken open its case with the arrest and alleged 
turning of the FSB's prime suspect, Adam Dekkushev. Under interrogation, 
Dekkushev allegedly fingered the (recently assassinated) Chechen warlord 
Khattab and another fighter, Achemez Gochiyaev, as being primarily responsible 
for the attacks (both of whom Russia claims to have found refuge at one time in 
Georgia's Pankisi Gorge).  
 
In prosecuting the government's case further, Patrushev has demanded that 
cooperation and information sharing between Russian and Georgian security 
services need to be increased dramatically. Despite Georgia's cooperation in the 
arrest and extradition of Dekkushev, Russia apparently remains dissatisfied with 
Tbilisi's refusal to allow the FSB and Russian military services to patrol and 
search the Pankisi Gorge itself. (INTERFAX, 1602 GMT, 29 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0829, via World News Connection) Georgia, for its part, has vowed to clear 
the gorge of criminal and terrorist elements using its own forces, a pledge which 
has been exploited by conspiracy theorists in Moscow. According to Rossiyskaya 
gazeta, there are those in the FSB who have tied Georgia's insistence on its 
territorial integrity directly to an alleged buyout by fugitive tycoon Boris 
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Berezovsky. They allege that Berezovsky, purportedly nervous concerning his 
association with those implicated by Dekkushev, bankrolled Georgia's anti-
criminal operations in exchange for Georgia's stonewalling Russia in order to (1) 
ensure that the FSB would never collect evidence tying him to the crimes, and (2) 
give himself a renewed forum for propagating his "misdirection" of blame for the 
bombings (as made famous in former FSB agent Aleksandr Litvinenko's book 
"The FSB Blows up Russia"). (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 30 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0830, via World News Connection) 
 
In a rare public expression of support for the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 
and MVD spetsnaz, Putin lauded "accomplishments" of these units in Chechnya 
despite what some describe as the unreasonable expectation that spetsnaz 
would follow the rule of law in time of war. Taking exception to the concessions 
granted to American soldiers by Central Asian states, in which the host countries 
have agreed to allow the US, rather than their own courts, to prosecute American 
soldiers for unlawful acts committed during the war on terror, Moscow wants a 
similar understanding for its own forces. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 29 Aug 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0829, via World News Connection)  
 
What Putin and other Russian officials fail to understand is that such an 
agreement is hardly an "a priori pardon" for crimes to be committed, but rather a 
diplomatic and legal agreement by the host states based on a profound trust that 
America will indeed punish offenders. Unfortunately for President Putin, such 
trust does not exist between other post-Soviet countries and Russia. Russian 
officials understandably are upset over the apparent refusal of the international 
community to recognize that in the new, post-Communist, Russia acts as though 
state-sponsored (or -condoned) ethnic cleansing would never occur...except, of 
course, in Chechnya, but that's a "special situation." 
 
 
 5 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
REGIONS 
Peat bogs, peat bogs, burning bright... 
Muscovites have become used to hearing about natural disasters. Occasionally, 
the Moscow government organizes humanitarian actions to help the regions. A 
train with 41 cars of food, clothing and medication left for the flood-damaged 
Krasnodar Krai on 24 August. A few days earlier, a train with 20 cars was 
dispatched to Daghestan. In July, humanitarian supplies were shipped out by 
train and airplane to North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Stavropol Krai and the 
Republic of Adygea. (ITAR-TASS, 0300 GMT, 24 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0824, 
via World News Connection) 
 
But this summer Muscovites have been exposed to a disaster of their own, the 
like of which they haven't seen -- they first thought, since the 1970s, and now, it 
turns out ever -- in their lives. The amount of suspended soot particles in the air, 
the huge clouds of smoke brought in from the peat bogs in the regions 
surrounding Moscow, especially to the south and east "exceeds the maximum 
permissible concentration of nitrogen oxide by 150-300 percent," according to 
Mosekomonitoring (state ecological monitoring agency) Director Nikolai Fursov. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0705 GMT, 5 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0905, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The severity of the fires is due, in part, to natural causes: This summer has been 
exceptionally dry -- the driest in about 100 years -- and the rains that, 
meteorologists predict, will put out a large number of the 1,959 separate fires that 
cover about 1,350 acres of land are not expected until later this week. (AGENCE 
FRANCE-PRESSE, 6 Sep 02; via Johnson's Russia List) The situation seems to 
 6 
improve when winds blow the clouds away from Moscow, or when a light drizzle 
washes the particles down, but then, once again, Muscovites wake to acrid air 
and walk around itchy-eyed, some covering their mouths and noses with 
handkerchiefs. Those with allergies or asthma are warned to stay indoors, and 
cases of fainting spells have been reported. 
 
But there are other factors that keep the fires burning week after week. The 
lackadaisical attitude of the authorities is of particular concern. That is not to say 
that officials are not reacting. They are setting regulations forbidding teachers to 
take schoolchildren outside for sports or excursions, appealing to residents not to 
panic, and delaying flights at times when visibility is worst. They are declaring 
states of emergency and ordering investigations into the ecological effects of the 
smog. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 6 Sep 02; via Johnson's Russia List) They 
are promising financial aid to the burning regions and dispatching soldiers to help 
fight the fires. However, the real problem derives from the extent to which 
emergency services have been run down in the past 15-20 years, the way that 
equipment has been stolen, sold, or broken, the lack of preparation, the empty 
emergency reservoirs and the delays in taking action. Moscow Oblast' 
Prosecutor Eduard Denisov announced that about 3,000 officials will have to 
shoulder administrative responsibility for negligence. (ORT, 6 Sep 02; via 
www.ortv.ru) 
 
Don't rain on my parade 
Muscovites were especially upset last weekend when, in honor of the Day of the 
City, rain clouds, which could have brought some relief, were dispersed by 
chemical means upon the orders of the city government. 
 
Officials are also downplaying the severity of the conditions. Deputy Mayor 
Valery Shantsev publicly cited a health department ruling that the smog has "no 
possible influence on health." (FINANCIAL TIMES, 6 Sep 02; via Johnson's 
Russia List) This is still better, however, than the stories that are told of Soviet 
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times, when dozens of soldiers were sent to their deaths in fighting fires with 
inadequate means. 
 
Follow the leader 
With the fires raging around Moscow, it was wise of several politicians to follow 
Russian President Vladimir Putin's lead -- and orders -- and to travel to various 
Russian regions to discuss other issues, ranging from illegal fishing to illegal 
migration. In particular, Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov traveled to 
the Far East and Siberia, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture 
Alexei Gordeev toured the Orel and Rostov Regions, and Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov traveled to the Far East and Siberia. The visits constituted an end-
of-summer push of Putin's usual agenda of keeping far-flung federal 
constituencies under the watchful eye and guiding hand of the Kremlin. The 
president himself kept to a pretty tight schedule -- an eight-day whirlwind tour 
through the Maritime Region, the Chita and Kemerovo Oblasts and the Republic 
of Tatarstan. 
 
In Vladivostok, the primary issue brought up by the Russian president was the 
"accelerated immigration of Chinese nationals to the Russian Far East" as 
"proceeding against the backdrop of ongoing migration outflow of Russians from 
the region." (ITAR-TASS, 0745 GMT, 24 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0824, via 
World News Connection) President Putin recommended a solution to the 
problem -- the strategic development of the Far East with the goal of "integration 
in the Russian national and world economic spheres." He stressed the 
importance of the special Far East Development Program which -- if fully 
implemented -- would double the region's GDP and result in financial self-
sufficiency. (ITAR-TASS, 1250 GMT, 23 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0823, via 
World News Connection) At the same time, the Russian Migration Service 
recommended the introduction of a triple tax on labor migrants -- labor duty, 
migration duty and payment for a migration card. (ITAR-TASS, 0950 GMT, 23 
Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0823, via World News Connection) Then, the president 
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met with environmental scientists and fishermen to discuss professional 
problems they were facing. 
 
Putin continued on the professional trail in Kemerovo, when he met 
representatives of the coal-mining industry. He also visited a number of military 
installations in the Far East and Siberia. (ITAR-TASS, 1848 GMT, 28 Aug 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0828, via World News Connection) 
 
The most important visit -- to one of the Russian Federation's most independent 
republics, Tatarstan -- Putin saved for last and timed to coincide with the World 
Congress of Tatars in Kazan. He chaired a meeting to discuss the celebration of 
the upcoming (August 2005) 1000-year anniversary of the founding of Kazan and 
met with the delegates to the Congress, taking the opportunity to make some 
points. President Putin called upon the participants of the World Congress to 
work toward the peaceful coexistence of various ethnic groups and religious 
confessions, reassured them of the noble intentions behind the upcoming 
census, took a stand against banning the study of national languages, asserted 
the importance of independence for religious organizations, and emphasized the 
importance of coordination between federal and regional bodies. (ITAR-TASS, 
0529 GMT, 3 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0903, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Ansel Stein 
 
Blast from the past? 
Expectations that Putin's Russia would be a dependable ally in the "war against 
terror" appear increasingly to have been naïve or at least premature. Russia's 
August flurry of diplomatic action in the Middle East was aimed at undermining 
American policy in the region. The logic is quite simple. Following a string of 
diplomatic setbacks on issues in which Russia's hand is not strong (e.g., 
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Georgia, Central Asia, the curtailment of the ABM Treaty, etc.), Russia has 
focused its relations with those states that are embroiled in conflict with the US 
(e.g., Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, etc.). Indeed, some of the very same 
individuals who organized Soviet support for these rogue states in the past may 
have played a role in Russia's current relations.  
 
Iraq 
In August it came to light that Russia and Iraq are finalizing the details of a long-
term cooperation agreement along the lines of the deal between Russia and Iran. 
The agreement, according to Russian sources, is valued at between $40-60 
billion. Moscow's stand, according to the foreign ministry's spokesman, Boris 
Malakhov, is that "the long-term program absolutely does not contradict the 
demands of the sanctions regime that is in effect in respect of Baghdad. And it 
cannot be different: indeed, Russia as a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council strictly adheres to its assumed international obligations. This naturally 
applies in a full measure to Iraq too." (ITAR-TASS, 19 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0819, via World News Connection) Russia is being particularly careful to claim 
that the pact will be strictly economic in nature, and will not include military aid. 
(INTERFAX, 19 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0819, via World News Connection) 
Such promises, however, raise doubts regarding this issue. At the very least the 
agreement is likely to provide so-called dual-use goods service, along the lines of 
the fiber optic cable that China sold to Iraq to upgrade the Iraqi air defense 
system. 
 
Russia remains Iraq's largest trading partner. (ITAR-TASS, 13 Aug 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-0813, via World News Connection) To describe the relationship as 
primarily economic, however, would be naïve. Moscow often goes to bat for 
Baghdad on the international political stage. For instance, Russia has begun to 
lobby for a change in the Iraqi oil-pricing mechanism, framing a "humanitarian" 
argument: If the retroactive pricing mechanism is not done away with, Moscow 
asserted at the 20 August meeting of the Iraq sanctions committee of the UN, the 
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United Nations humanitarian program will fail and the consequences for the Iraqi 
people will be disastrous. (ITAR-TASS, 20 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0820, via 
World News Connection) Russia's track record regarding the wellbeing of 
persons within its own borders, particularly in Chechnya, makes such stated 
concerns for Iraqis less than persuasive. More likely motivations stem from 
competition with the United States and the desire to ensure that Iraq will be able 
to pay for the "economic cooperation" it is purchasing from Moscow. 
 
Lastly, and most importantly, Russia is firmly backing Iraqi efforts to arouse 
international opposition to any military action by the United States against 
Saddam Hussein's regime. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov went so far as to say that 
Russia hoped the United Nations Security Council would not be asked to 
approve military action against Iraq, "so there will be no need for a Russian veto." 
(THE NEW YORK TIMES, 2 Sep 02; via lexis-nexis) The message could not be 
clearer. 
 
Iran 
Russo-Iranian ties are being strengthened daily. Russian scientists have begun 
installation of heavy equipment at the first atomic unit of the Bushehr nuclear 
power plant, the director-general of Atomstroyeksport, Viktor Kozlov, told ITAR-
TASS on 1 September. (ITAR-TASS, 1 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0901, via World 
News Connection) Moreover, as if it did not suffice that Russia refuses to 
respond to US warnings concerning transfer of nuclear technology to Iran, 
Russia now admits that five reactors, not merely Bushehr, are under discussion. 
According to Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, "a program of 
interaction of Moscow and Tehran has been prepared," referring to the sister 
agreement to the aforementioned Russo-Iraqi compact (a program of trade, 
economic, industrial and scientific-technological cooperation for the years to 
2012). (ITAR-TASS, 28 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0828, via World News 
Connection)  
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On 22 August, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov (former chief 
of the FSB), signaled that cooperation was diplomatic as well as economic. 
Russia, Trubnikov said, "does not consider America's attitude to Iran 
constructive. Israel's interests," he continued, "show through clearly on this 
issue." (ITAR-TASS, 22 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0822, via World News 
Connection) In addition, Iranian and Russian experts discussed the 
"strengthening of strategic stability, preparations for the 2005 Review Conference 
of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
prospects for the entry into force of the Treaty on Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban (CTBT), the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, and international negotiations on strengthening the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Biological Weapons," according to the Russian 
foreign ministry. (ITAR-TASS, 23 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0823, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Syria 
Finally, it was announced by Israeli military officials that Israel had become 
aware of a request by Syria to Rosoboroneksport for a consignment of Igla 
SAMs. Damascus' intention to hand over the systems and ammunition (i.e., 
9M39 anti-aircraft missiles) to its allies on the territory of Lebanon controlled by 
the Syrian army (i.e., Hezbollah) is not being concealed. It is here that the short-
sightedness of Russian policy becomes painfully obvious. Hezbollah (which has 
been declared "a terrorist organization" by the US and compared to al-Qaeda by 
a senior US diplomat) is certainly sympathetic to Chechen fighters. Russia lost 
two military helicopters to Igla missiles in the last month, events that were costly 
in lives and in prestige. Russia must be aware of the potential risk, but it is likely 
that the sale will go through anyway. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Steve Kwast 
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Increased equipment sales bring more than just money 
The past few months have unveiled even more evidence that Russian President 
Vladimir Putin is accelerating the sale of Russian military equipment and using it 
as a fundraiser to help save the future of the armed forces and Russia's "rightful" 
strategic place in the world. Flooding world markets with military equipment not 
only puts money in his pocket, it also increases his influence and bargaining 
position in each region of sales. 
 
This year Russia increased such sales to $3.5 billion worth of military hardware. 
This is a $300 million increase over last year. The general director of the state-
owned exporting agency Rosoboroneksport, Andrei Belyaninov, told the RBK 
news agency that Russia's arms export has developed a distinct uptrend over the 
last few years. The increase consists mostly of aircraft technologies and space 
services (ITAR-TASS, 1427 GMT, 21 Aug 02; FBIS-CHI-2002-0821, via World 
News Connection) and includes over 1,000 contracts with 69 countries. (ITAR-
TASS, 1237 GMT, 17 Jul 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0717, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The president is not satisfied with simply this increase in total volume. In a 
meeting with his minister of science, industry and technology on 6 August, Putin 
reiterated the "need for more vigorous restructuring of the military-industrial 
complex in order to enhance the competitiveness of our products on the markets 
and to maintain the armed forces of the Russian Federation at the modern level." 
(VREMYA MN, 8 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0808, via World News Connection) 
One example of this is the state-sponsored collaboration of the Mil and Kazan 
helicopter factories in Moscow, and the Kronstadt company in St. Petersburg to 
transform the Mi-17 helicopter into a custom-made, affordable military helicopter 
targeted to specific countries throughout the world. The package of equipment 
and services that comes with this sale gives Russia a clear lead over any other 
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supplier in the world and increases its appeal. (ITAR-TASS, 0715 GMT, 22 Jul 
01; FBIS-SOV-2002-0722, via World News Connection) 
 
These efforts to coordinate a strategy towards increasing military sales are 
working. In the last month alone, Syria, Iran, Nigeria, Columbia, Kuwait and 
Turkey all have moved forward to buy a significant amount of Russian 
equipment. It is interesting to note the language and theme of each press 
conference announcing a sale. The press conference regarding Nigeria, which 
took delivery of three Mi-34S helicopters, focused on how its successful 
operational use of the helicopters would help Russia to promote the same type of 
sales in the markets of other countries. (ITAR-TASS, 1240 GMT, 6 Aug 02; FBIS-
AFR-2002-0806, via World News Connection) Columbia took delivery of six Mi-
17-MD helicopters in a ceremony similar to the one in Nigeria. The theme was 
the Mi-17's superiority over any American helicopter of the same class, and how 
other countries could also take advantage of this military capability. (ITAR-TASS, 
0133 GMT, 3 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0803, via World News Connection) The 
same "hard push for sales," and "advertisement-style" press conferences were 
evident in the case of the contracts for Syria, Iran, Turkey and Kuwait. They 
represent a change in the way Russia markets its military equipment and 
highlight the fact that Moscow is pursuing a strategy to sell as much military 
equipment as possible to as many countries as it can. 
 
The reason for this strategy is clear. Putin needs the money if he wants to 
transform the Russian military in line with his 2010 plan. Earlier this year he 
adopted an arms program for the year 2010 to set up a powerful and efficient 
military with primary focus on its space force and strategic rocket force. To 
support that goal, and also spend 79 billion rubles on national defense this year, 
Putin needs to be aggressive about increasing his incoming cash flow. (KOREAN 
CENTRAL BROADCASTING STATION, 0538 GMT, 19 Jul 02; FBIS-EAS-2002-
0719, via World News Connection)  
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Putin, however, gains much more than just money by selling military goods. He 
gains influence, access and international prestige in every arena in which he 
sells military hardware. He also benefits from the fact that the US spreads itself 
thin trying to maintain a balance of access and influence in each region. A good 
example is China. 
 
Russia has been selling military and high-tech (dual-use) technology and 
equipment to China at an alarming rate. Over the first six months of 2002, Russia 
sold China $20.8 million worth of equipment in the high technology sphere alone, 
compared to only $11.7 million for all of last year. (INTERFAX, 1126 GMT, 31 Jul 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0731, via World News Connection) This fact, coupled with 
the increase in sales of traditional military hardware, has further increased US 
concern regarding that region of the world. Additionally, at last month's Asian 
Regional Forum in Brunei, as US Secretary of State Colin Powell was busy 
drumming up support for global counter-terrorism, China proposed a new 
security doctrine that envisions China, and not the US, as the dominant player in 
a new regional security order. (THE NATION, Internet Version, 12 Aug 02; FBIS-
EAS-2002-0812, via World News Connection) If China were able to collect 
enough military hardware to stage a conventional amphibious attack on Taiwan 
thanks to Russian arms sales, the US would be caught off guard with no military 
presence in the area that could stop such an attack. In the end, therefore, such 
sales enable Putin to increase his influence in the region. 
 
The US needs to re-think its capabilities-based planning to stay proactive, and 
not reactive, to Russia's increased military sales around the world. 
 
The Caspian Sea Exercise: Intimidation alone, or a precursor to invasion? 
Last month, Russia held the largest military exercise ever undertaken in the 
Caspian Sea. It came about because of Putin's frustration with the failure of the 
five-nation Caspian Summit to reach an agreement desired by Moscow on the 
delineation of the Caspian Sea. The official goal outlined by Russia was merely 
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to test the ability of the troops to battle terrorism and crack down on criminal 
activities at sea. (TA KUNG PAO, Internet Version, 18 Aug 02; FBIS-NES-2002-
0819, via World News Connection) However, Putin obtained three benefits from 
one exercise. He signaled to the four other littoral states that he holds all the 
military cards in the region, he obtained some marginal training for his troops, 
and he maintained a level of fear in Chechnya and Georgia. 
 
The intimidation is subtle but clear, and consistent with the ongoing moves by 
Moscow to pressure Georgia at every opportunity and re-establish Russian 
influence. In a news conference held in Kaspiysk, just as the military exercise 
was reaching its highest point, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov didn't 
focus on the exercise but rather on Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, reiterating 
Moscow's demands for direct involvement. "This issue can only be settled by 
using force. There is no point in talking with terrorists, trying to convince them or 
reasoning with them. The whole world knows it. Either they [terrorists] must face 
the law-enforcement agencies or their bodies must be presented for 
identification." (INTERFAX, 1149 GMT, 10 Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0810, via 
World News Connection) This statement was punctuated by the massive military 
operation going on just miles away. 
 
Moscow has been using every incident in the Chechen conflict lately to present 
Russian incursions onto Georgian territory as part of counter-terrorism efforts. 
Two week ago Russia accused Georgia of harboring terrorists and quickly 
blamed those "terrorists" for shooting down the Mi-26 military transport helicopter 
that crashed near Khankala killing over 116 soldiers. (INTERFAX, 1358 GMT, 20 
Aug 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0820, via World News Connection) Russia also justified 
the latest series of cross-border air raids into Georgia as nothing more than raids 
on terrorists. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 24 Aug 02) It is not a stretch to conclude 
that these Caspian Sea exercises are meant to flex Russian military muscle in 
the region that might be used eventually to invade Georgia under the pretext of 
fighting terrorism. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
UKRAINE 
Time for Yushchenko to 'stand up' 
Since their country declared independence 11 years ago, Ukrainians have been 
disappointed regularly by those who would lead them. Charges of corruption, 
criminality, oppression and incompetence have plagued most public officials, 
disillusioning those who originally backed them, and leading to a loss of support 
for the political system that produced them. In the last two years, the country, 
among other things, has seen its former parliamentary speaker arrested in the 
United States for large-scale embezzlement and its current president accused of 
murder.  
 
By just about every Western measurement, Ukraine is sliding backward toward 
authoritarianism. Freedom House continuously has noted a steady decline in 
democratization, while Transparency International recently found Ukraine to be 
one of the most corrupt countries in the world -- ahead of Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, 
and Argentina, to name a few. (For further information, see 
www.freedomhouse.org and www.transparency.org) It is no surprise then that 
Ukrainians, in survey after survey, say they do not trust any political leader -- any 
political leader, that is, except former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko. 
 
For two years, the former prime minister has been the most trusted, liked and 
publicly supported politician in Ukraine. This reputation was earned. During his 
brief two-and-one-half-year tenure beginning in 1998, Yushchenko created an 
economic policy that resulted in the eradication of wage arrears in most sectors, 
resumption of international aid, reduction of energy shortages, and an increase in 
agricultural production. Most controversially, he also attempted to rein in the 
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"oligarchs" who have, according to many observers, criminally profited while 
controlling the country's major industries. As a result of all of this activity, 
Ukraine's gross domestic product grew for the first time under Yushchenko's 
cabinet and its standard of living increased (albeit only moderately). With 
competent leadership, the country finally was headed in the right direction. 
 
Then, tapes appeared that reportedly contained a conversation implicating 
Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma in the death of investigative journalist 
Georgiy Gongadze. Kuchma became an international pariah, internal unrest 
skyrocketed and Yushchenko's popularity became a threat to the besieged 
president. In April 2001, after a long political battle between the presidential 
administration and the parliament, Yushchenko was ousted. Leaders of the newly 
formed, Gongadze-inspired Ukrainian opposition quickly rallied around the former 
premier, and Yushchenko seemed to embrace their ideas. When asked at the 
time about the future of Ukraine, Yushchenko responded easily. "I am optimistic," 
he said. "Today democratic forces were able to hear the bell they couldn't hear 
before. You have to fight for transparent politics and a non-criminal economy and 
democracy. If we want to have it, we have to fight for it." (WASHINGTON POST, 
29 April 01; via lexis-nexis) The statement seemed to signal a new era in 
Ukrainian politics, when leading opposition figures would unite to fight for a more 
democratically oriented Ukraine.  
 
Yushchenko, however, was hesitant to criticize personally the man who had 
orchestrated his ouster. The opposition, he suggested, should be "mainly 
oriented at a unifying notion and not against somebody." (IBID.) That somebody, 
of course, was President Kuchma. 
 
He followed the same principle at the start of his campaign during the 
parliamentary elections of 31 March 2002. In fact, he worked to separate his 
bloc, Our Ukraine, from the more radical opposition parties of Yulia Tymoshenko 
and Oleksandr Moroz, which included Kuchma's impeachment in their platforms. 
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But, as Yushchenko's access to the media was cut off and law enforcement 
officials began to target him regularly, he began vigorously criticizing 
administration-supported candidates in the election, and lashed out at Kuchma's 
interference in the electoral process. The tactic worked. When all was said and 
done, Our Ukraine had won the clear majority of party list seats in the chamber. 
More important, Viktor Yushchenko had demonstrated his status as the most 
significant political leader in the country, and appeared able to challenge 
President Kuchma if he chose to do so. 
 
It seems he did not. Six months after its victory in the parliamentary elections, 
Yushchenko's Our Ukraine has been reduced to a minority by Kuchma's back-
room maneuvering. Despite the fact the voters wholeheartedly rejected the 
parties backing him during the election, Kuchma now boasts the support of 231 
deputies in the 450-person body. Opposition members accuse the president of 
using bribery and blackmail to "convince" deputies elected on their party lists, as 
well as those elected as independents, to support the "majority." Regardless of 
the methods used, the result has been the installation of a pro-Kuchma speaker 
of parliament and control of the major parliamentary committees. All the while, 
Yushchenko has occasionally complained, but acted very little.  
 
Tymoshenko and Moroz, on the other hand, have formed a strong partnership 
and have worked to keep the opposition movement united, active and as 
effective as possible in the face of enormous pressure from the authorities. They 
have enlisted the support of the Communist Party, which is also staunchly anti-
administration. The Communists will support the opposition, Party leader Petro 
Symonenko said, "until we get answers to the main questions of Kuchma's 
dismissal and the adoption of laws to boost democracy in this country." 
(INTERFAX, 31 Aug 02; via lexis-nexis) As a result, for the first time, Ukraine 
truly does have a diverse, active and self-sustaining opposition movement. 
Yushchenko, however -- the man with the best ability to reach and mobilize the 
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public -- seems to be nowhere in sight. As human rights come under attack more 
aggressively than ever before, Yushchenko remains remarkably inactive. 
 
This is nowhere more evident than in the preparations for the "Stand Up, 
Ukraine!" demonstrations to be held throughout the country. On 2 September, 
Tymoshenko, Moroz and Symonenko called on the country to join them in 
commemorating the second anniversary of the disappearance of Georgiy 
Gongadze, calling for democratic reforms, and urging that early presidential 
elections be held (Kuchma's term expires in 2004). The three then departed for a 
national tour, where as many as 10,000 persons met them at each stop along the 
way. The tour will culminate in Kyiv on 16 September, the date that Gongadze 
went missing.  
 
Instead of participating in this action, however, Yushchenko chose to release an 
"open letter" to the president. In it, he called upon Kuchma to "support Our 
Ukraine's initiative for the formation of a parliamentary majority based on the 
political force that was the leader in the parliamentary elections," and "appoint a 
coalition government formed by the parliamentary majority," among nine total 
points. The letter also reiterated "the readiness of the political forces making up 
Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc for a broad dialogue,... " since, no doubt, 
dialogue had worked so well in the past. (KYIV POST, 6 Sep 02; via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Yushchenko then promised not to make any 
decision about whether to take part in the 16 September protest action until he 
received an answer from the president. 
 
This answer came quickly, and was not exactly a surprise. "As president, I will 
not accept the demands," Kuchma announced. (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 6 Sep 02; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) And that was that.  
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Yushchenko's decision, however, has not been as swift. In fact, he has remained 
indecisive and noncommittal. As a result, he has undermined the protest action, 
and left his three most important allies on their own.  
 
Tymoshenko must feel Yushchenko's distance more than anyone, since she 
once again is being targeted by administration officials in questionable criminal 
probes. This time, Kuchma's prosecutor-general, Sviatoslav Pyskun, plans to 
charge Tymoshenko with embezzlement. The charge is just the latest in several 
years-worth of failed attempts to convict Tymoshenko of something -- anything. 
Authorities are proceeding, however, with renewed vigor following the recent 
formation of the pro-Kuchma parliamentary majority. On 21 August, in fact, 
Pyskun sent a letter to parliament asking that the body revoke Tymoshenko's 
parliamentary immunity. Although it is unlikely, one of the benefits of the new 
majority could be an agreement to do just that. Even though this decision could 
affect an ally, however, Yushchenko has followed his now familiar pattern and 
remained silent. 
 
Most important, the former prime minister has been muted in his response to 
Kuchma's offer to limit his own power. The president suggested in a nationally 
televised address on Ukraine's Independence Day that the country must move 
from a presidential to a parliamentary republic. While this technically would limit 
Kuchma's authority, in reality, it would very efficiently remove most power from 
the next president and place it in the hands of the pro-Kuchma parliamentary 
group. This would allow Kuchma to continue influencing political events even in 
the years following his retirement -- in essence, a form of the Yel'tsin scenario. 
Additionally, it would barely affect Kuchma currently, since he now effectively 
controls parliament.  
 
Observers have suggested numerous reasons for Yushchenko's inactivity, from 
simply an aversion to confrontation to a secret agreement with Kuchma. If, for 
example, Yushchenko remains silent about the persecution of Tymoshenko and 
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does not participate in the 16 September protest, will he be given the soon-to-be-
vacant post of prime minister? Or does he truly believe that compromise and 
appeasement will achieve his goals? Likely, a combination of these two 
approaches is closer to the truth. It seems that Viktor Yushchenko may be 
attempting to maintain as much neutrality as possible in order to preserve what 
little remaining influence he has in the administration, or possibly to increase his 
influence in the near future. Perhaps he hopes to use this influence to 
accomplish what Tymoshenko and Moroz are attempting to achieve through 
protest. Yushchenko has, after all, never been one to confront; throughout his 
career, he has relied on his ability to compromise and form coalitions. Until 
recently, that ability served him well. But to form coalitions genuinely, there must 
be more than one side willing to compromise. Unfortunately, it seems likely that 
compromise on Yushchenko's part at this point would accomplish little more than 
legitimizing a corrupt administration, while undermining the opposition. Perhaps 
Viktor Yuschenko understands this, perhaps he does not. But either way, it 
seems that the people of Ukraine may be on the road to yet another 
disappointment from a once promising political leader. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
GEORGIA 
Georgia secures Pankisi Gorge 
On 23 August the Georgian MVD moved into the Pankisi Gorge with 1,000 men 
and established checkpoints throughout the area. Two days later the army held 
exercises with up to 1,500 soldiers in the same district which were clearly meant 
to provide backup to the MVD. (WWW.CIVIL.GE, 26 Aug 02) The Georgian side 
has established control over the troubled gorge and has arrested several 
suspects, including an ethnic Arab carrying a French passport.  
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Hence, over the last two weeks, Georgia has effectively countered Russia's claim 
that order cannot be restored without the use of Russian troops. Since the 
accusation that Georgia cannot control its territory is no longer tenable, Russian 
pressure is being directed along another vector -- towards inflaming Georgia's 
rebel territories and using KGB provocateurs to smear Shevardnadze.  
 
It should be noted that over a month of threats and aggression from Russia, 
Georgia's mainstream political parties have remained firmly behind 
Shevardnadze. (See THE NIS OBSERVED, 14 Aug 02) 
 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia to cooperate 
Leaders of the rebel regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia met in Sukhumi on 7 
September to coordinate their plans. "President" of South Ossetia Eduard 
Kokoita and "Prime Minister" of Abkhazia Anri Dzhergeniya said that Georgia's 
operation in Pankisi is a farce. ... Kokoita claimed that Chechen fighters who 
have been squeezed out of the Pankisi Gorge are amassing on the Russian-
Ossetian border. The two rebel regions of Georgia pledged mutual assistance. 
(RUSSIAN TELEVISION, ORT, 7 Sep 02) 
 
Giorgadze: 'If I wanted to kill Shevardnadze' 
The former head of the Georgian Security Service, Igor Giorgadze, fled Georgia 
after his aborted coup against Shevardnadze in 1995. Since then the 
internationally wanted criminal apparently has been living in Russia, which, 
despite repeated Georgian requests, has refused to extradite him. Igor's brother 
Pantelemon is the chairman of Georgia's Socialist Party and the only Georgian 
politician who has demanded Shevardnadze's resignation in the context of the 
current crisis.  
 
In his interview with Izvestia on 4 September, Igor Giorgadze asserted that "If I 
wanted to kill Shevardnadze, we would be standing on his grave." Giorgadze 
asserts that he has extensive documentary evidence of Shevardnadze's 
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"crimes," including ordering murders during the Soviet period when he served as 
the MVD minister of Georgia. This approach of dredging up dubious Kompromat 
from the hazy past is reminiscent of the suit filed by several Duma deputies 
accusing Shevardnadze of betraying Russia's interests when as Soviet foreign 
minister he negotiated the division of the Bering Sea between the USSR and the 
US. 
 
Giorgadze claims that his "All-Georgian Patriotic Alliance" was legally registered 
in Georgia in the summer of 2001 and represents nine opposition parties of the 
extreme left and the extreme right. "In the not too distant future" this alliance will 
"emerge as the nucleus around which certain parts of the Georgian opposition 
can unite," he said. He also claims that at the proper time the alliance can bring 
50,000 persons into the streets to demand Shevardnadze's resignation and new 
elections. 
 
From Russia Giorgadze does not expect military support but help with economic 
reconstruction and energy supplies. In keeping with Russian propaganda, 
Giorgadze goes on to say that, according to his Georgian sources, the terrorists 
who exploded buildings in Moscow in 1999 are hiding in the Pankisi Gorge and 
that on 23 August 2002 Georgia's planes bombed their own territory! (Since 
Giorgadze's interview, the FSB has begun to repeat his allegations that the 
organizers of the 1998 blasts are hiding out in Pankisi Gorge.) 
 
CHECHNYA 
Chechen MVD under attack from military 
Two recent incidents suggest that the Russian military is gunning for the 
Chechen MVD. President Putin has repeated on several occasions that the 
Chechen MVD should take on the leading role in providing order in the republic 
and most of the military units currently in Chechnya should be withdrawn. The 
military, however, is committed to sabotaging such plans. 
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On 3 September a truck carrying Russian and Chechen MVD officers was blown 
up as it was returning to the Shali commandant's building after carrying out a 
special operation in Duba Yurt, Kommersant reported on 4 September. Eight 
persons were killed and 11 were wounded. Kommersant reporter Musa Muradov 
was told that the truck was blown up as a result of artillery bombardment by the 
Joint Group of Forces in Chechnya. The head of the Shali Administration, Sharip 
Alikhadzhiev, asserted that the truck was blown up by the 70th Division and 
commented that such incidents occur often. Presidential Representative for 
Human Rights in the Chechen Republic, Abdul Khakim Sutygov, also claimed 
that it seemed more likely that the truck was destroyed by artillery than by a 
mine.  
 
The event is Shali follows on a similar disaster in Shatoi. Award-winning 
journalist Anna Politkovskaya published a lengthy and detailed analysis of the 
incident in Shatoi where 17 Chechen MVD officers perished on 6 August. 
(NOVAYA GAZETA, 26 Aug 02) According to Politkovskaya, when the truck 
carrying the Chechen MVD hit a mine not 50 meters from the Shatoi 
headquarters, Russian positions were given the order to shoot. And in fact 
Russian soldiers shot at the burning truck with wounded Chechen MVD 
personnel. The order to shoot at the truck was issued by Shatoi Commandant 
Aleksandr Bondarenko. According to witness testimony obtained by 
Politkovskaya, the MVD unit left the headquarters on the oral instructions from 
Bondarenko, without taking proper precautions. 
 
According to the official version, three Chechen saboteurs were responsible for 
the Shatoi incident. But Politkovskaya is able to show that the persons accused 
were picked up by masked spetsnaz in Grozny on 30 July. Then they were killed 
and their bodies shown on television as perpetrators of the Shali bombing. The 
real organizers, Politkovskaya hints, were GRU.  
 
Two helicopters downed 
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Two military helicopters were shot down over the last month. An Igla missile took 
out an MI-26 transport helicopter near Khankala on 19 August and an MI-24 
helicopter was shot down on 31 August. The death toll from the first crash alone 
(121) exceeds the number of those who perished on the Kursk.  
Some newspapers (see, for instance, NOVYE IZVESTIA, 3 Sep 02) suggest that 
Chechen fighters have acquired a large stock of anti-aircraft weapons, most likely 
Igla. The paper conjectures that the weapons can play the same role in 
Chechnya as they did in Afghanistan in the 1980s, altering the environment in 
favor of the partisans against the military. However, the Chechens have had the 
Igla for some time and there have been spates of helicopter downings in the 
past. For instance, four helicopters were downed over roughly six weeks in 
January and February 2002. 
 
Maskhadov: Dead again? 
On 4 September Moskovsky komsomolets started the unconfirmed rumor that 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov is dead. The "news" was picked up by 
NTV during its midday broadcast and then spread throughout the media. Denials 
were issued by the official web page of the Chechen government, chechenpress, 
and by Maskhadov's spokesman, Akhmed Zakaev.  
 
Moskovsky komsomolets claims that the Russian side learned of Maskhadov's 
death from soldiers who were captured in July. According to this version, the 
Chechen president was killed in a rocket attack in June. Moreover, Russian 
surveillance purportedly has not picked up Maskhadov's telephone conversations 
since June nor has Maskhadov appeared on camera.  
 
In the unlikely event that Maskhadov is dead, this may explain the string of 
bizarre appointments. Since June "Maskhadov" has appointed his archenemies 
Shamil Basaev, Movladi Udugov, and Zelimkhan Yanderbiev to top positions. 
Another strange factor is that Russian officials refuse to comment on the rumor of 
Maskhadov's death, whereas in the past military and security services officials 
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have rushed to claim the laurels for their service. For instance, when in April the 
FSB announced that its agents had eliminated Khattab, the head of the General 
Staff Anatoly Kvashnin immediately claimed that his men had killed Basaev. 
Kvashnin's claim was proven false shortly thereafter when Basaev contacted the 
press. This time around Maskhadov most likely will do likewise. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By David Montgomery 
 
Seeking one voice, living another: poverty without representation 
At the recent United Nations' World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(Johannesburg, 26 August - 4 September), issues relevant to Central Asian 
countries were in the forefront: the responsible use of natural resources, 
sustainable integration into the global economy, and the improved quality of life 
around the world. (For more information, see www.johannesburgsummit.org) 
Arguing that poverty is connected to frailties of humanity ranging from the 
irresponsible use of resources to incidents of terrorism, analysts have suggested 
that the alleviation of poverty is one responsibility necessary to ameliorate these 
ills.  
 
Citing the Ferghana Valley (a region shared by Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan) as an example of poverty creating an atmosphere supportive of 
religious extremism and the threat of terrorism, the Central Asian states 
suggested the importance of improving the population's standard of living, 
bringing it more in line with that of developed nations. The argument prevailing at 
the summit was that it is up to developed and developing nations to join in 
responsible ways to curtail human and environmental poverty. The summit 
declaration stated clearly, however, that "democracy, the rule of law, respect for 
human rights and freedoms, and achievement of peace and security are 
essential for the full achievement of sustainable development." (EURASIANET, 6 
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Sep 02; via www.eurasianet.org) Such statements require the governments of 
Central Asia to be more equitable in the distribution of wealth and application of 
legislation, and to embrace reform strategies favoring a stable multi-party political 
system. 
 
While the standard of life in Central Asia generally is regarded as low, there are 
resources of wealth that, if properly utilized, could go far in addressing the issue 
of poverty. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have deposits of fossil 
fuels that could infuse the social services funds with needed resources. And 
while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan do not have the large oil and gas reserves, they 
do have water and hydroelectric potential that could be made more productive 
through the upgrading of physical plants and the selling/exchange of water for 
the fossil fuels of its neighbors. (Assigning an economic value to water and 
convincing other nations that it is a resource that should be purchased is 
complicated; but water does stand as an ever important resource, especially to 
countries in short supply, such as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.) 
 
Poverty does appear to create a more receptive environment for extreme 
expressions of discontent, but such expressions are more complex than poverty 
alone and are usually directed against the ruling governments. Thus, while the 
fact that the support base for Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), a radical Islamic group 
prevalent in the Ferghana Valley and elsewhere that advocates the 
establishment of sharia, has increased is important, what is more significant is 
that the increased membership is not seen as being a revival of personal 
religious devotion, but, as one observer noted --requesting anonymity for fear of 
government harassment -- because of "unemployment, declining living standards 
and vague prospects for the future." (EURASIANET, 5 Sep 02; via 
www.eurasianet.org) 
 
 
 28 
Unemployment, lower living standards, and future opportunities are linked to 
dissatisfaction with the government. Thus, in a region where voices of political 
opposition have been quelled through legal sanctions and intimidation, increased 
membership in HT in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, or protest marches 
in Kyrgyzstan express the collective discontent with government's success in 
improving the standard of living and incorporating oppositional views. Examples 
of political repression and political intimidation include the recent seven-year 
prison sentence of Ghalymzhan Zhaqiyanov, a Kazakh opposition politician 
(CENTRAL ASIA - CAUCASUS ANALYST, 28 Aug 02; via www.cacianalyst.org), 
and Kyrgyz Prime Minister Nikolai Tanaev's call for inquiry into the finances of 
protest groups. (INTERFAX, 1134 GMT, 3 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0903, via 
World News Connection) The depth of discontent can be symbolized by the 
staging of a 600-kilometer march from southern Kyrgyzstan to Bishkek, wherein 
protestors are requesting the resignation of President Askar Akaev. (INTERFAX, 
1009 GMT, 4 Sep 02, and ITAR-TASS, 1409 GMT, 4 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-
0904, via World News Connection) 
 
In response to calls for political reform, however, both President Akaev and 
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev have balked. On 4 September, the 
Constitutional Council in Kyrgyzstan proposed that some powers of the president 
be passed to parliament. Specifically, the council has suggested strengthening 
the role of the prime minister, wherein the prime minister would be elected by 
parliament rather than appointed by the president. Not surprisingly, Akaev has 
expressed his opposition to yielding power to parliament, arguing that "the idea of 
a parliamentary republic is not viable at present because the political structure is 
still weak"; that democracy has not developed enough and "insufficiently strong 
political parties [are] represented in the parliament." (INTERFAX, 0953 GMT, 4 
Sep 02, and ITAR-TASS, 0955 GMT, 4 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0904, and 
ITAR-TASS, 1042 GMT, 3 Sep 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0903, via World News 
Connection) 
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Likewise, President Nazarbaev has argued against a parliamentary foundation of 
government wherein his control of power might be mitigated: "What Kazakhstan 
currently needs is strong state power with a presidential form of government." 
(INTERFAX, 1435 GMT, 29 Aug 02, and ITAR-TASS, 1346 GMT, 29 Aug 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0829, via World News Connection) 
 
Thus, both Akaev and Nazarbaev argue for strong presidencies wherein their 
control of power remains close to absolute. There appears to be little room for 
the legitimate development of a political opposition which can express divergent 
views. The absence of a developed forum to voice concerns gives credence to 
HT and protest marches as expressions of discontent. And while the 
governments of Central Asia are interacting in international forums, calling for the 
world community to assist them in bringing their standard of living to a level 
comparable to that of developed countries, to do so without democratic 
incorporation of voices within the country seems unlikely to produce positive 
results. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
EU-US rift causes concern in the Baltics 
When Lithuanian sovereignty was overlooked and the European Union (EU) and 
Russia started negotiations concerning the Schengen Agreement and 
Kaliningrad transit rights, little did Latvia and Estonia realize they too would 
become embroiled in a struggle between two powers. This time the debate is 
between two apparently "friendly" powers -- the United States and the European 
Union, a situation which Estonian Prime Minister Siim Kallas called "having to 
choose between mother and father." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 5 Sep 02; via 
lexis-nexis) While both the US and the EU claim to want the same thing for the 
Baltic states - free market economies governed by democratic governments 
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subjugated to the "rule of law" -- the illusion of like-mindedness was dispelled 
abruptly in the face of discussions concerning the International Criminal Court 
(ICC). The US, which is opposed to the ICC, is seeking immunity for its 
servicemen through bilateral agreements; the EU has called for aspirants to 
close ranks and support the official EU position by blocking the US from reaching 
such bilateral agreements.  
 
The ICC controversy reportedly has brought about US threats to withdraw 
military support from ICC signatory states. The warning was allegedly delivered 
by the US ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, Pierre-Richard Prosper, 
who alarmed the Baltic states and other NATO applicant countries, when he 
stated during a video interview that "If they (meaning applicants) do not enter into 
such an agreement, this will be an issue raised in the context of NATO. That is 
the situation. We cannot avoid raising the matter. It is something that worries the 
United States." (POLITIKEN, 21 Aug 02, FBIS-EEU-2002-0821, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Prosper's statement highlighted a US law known as the American 
Servicemembers' Protection Act. This act, which becomes effective with the 
ratification of the Rome Statute (establishing the ICC) by 60 of the signatory 
countries, forbids military assistance to any country that is a member of the 
Rome Statute, except those that are members of NATO or other key allies 
(defined as Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Argentina, South Korea, New 
Zealand, and Taiwan). (AMERICAN SERVICEMEMBERS' PROTECTION ACT, 
HR4475). As aspiring members to NATO, the Baltic states are not included within 
this list. Thus the countries are in a precarious position: Solidarity with EU policy 
could mean the loss of US military aid, while signing the bilateral agreement 
would put the states at odds with the EU. 
 
The withdrawal of US military aid would be devastating for the Baltic states. In 
the last year alone, millions of dollars in US military aid have been provided. 
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Without this kind of funding, not to mention the possible loss of political support, 
a formal invitation to join the alliance would be unlikely.  
 
For the last decade, the mainstay of all three Baltic states' foreign policy has 
been to obtain membership in NATO, a move seen as vital to the prevention of 
any neo-imperialist actions by Russia in the region. Joining the European Union, 
on the other hand, is viewed as critical for the Baltic states' return to Europe both 
economically and politically. If the US and the EU cannot settle the matter, the 
Baltic states may be forced to decide whether NATO or the EU best suits their 
long-term security needs.  
 
Fortunately, on 4 September, US President George W. Bush and Secretary of 
State Colin Powel allayed Baltic fears by informing Estonian Prime Minister Siim 
Kallas that at this time the issue of the ICC would not affect any invitation to join 
the alliance at the upcoming Prague Summit. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 5 Sep 
02; via lexis-nexis) This confirms earlier statements made by Estonian Defense 
Minister Kristiina Ojuland that Estonia had not encountered and does not expect 
to receive pressure from the US concerning the ICC bilateral agreement. 
Furthermore, she hinted that the EU and the US will reach a settlement on the 
ICC in mid-September. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE, 26 Aug 02; via lexis-nexis) An 
ICC settlement would let the Baltic states off the hook altogether. According to 
Latvian Prime Minister Andris Berzins, there is no such thing as too much 
security. "Pragmatically approaching these matters, we see that our participation 
in NATO is an additional guarantee that nobody ... ever divides the world into 
spheres of influence behind our back, that there are no new modifications of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact[s]." 
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